Aristotle's Objection to the Platonic Theory of Reminiscence

Authors

  • Alejandro Farieta Author Universitaria Agustiniana

Keywords:

Plato, Aristotle, Meno’s Paradox, reminiscence, induction

Abstract

This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to thesolution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, whenPlato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achievedis induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semanticcriticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theoryis not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.

DOI: 10.5294/pecu.2015.18.2.1

 

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Alejandro Farieta, Universitaria Agustiniana

Docente investigador, Universitaria Agustiniana. Candidato a Doctor en Filosofía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Downloads

Published

2016-07-18

Issue

Vol. 18 No. 2 (2015)

Section

Research Articles

License

1. Proposed Policy for Journals That Offer Open Access

 

Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:

  1. This journal and its papers are published with the Creative Commons License Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). You are free to share copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format if you: give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made; don’t use our material for commercial purposes; don’t remix, transform, or build upon the material.