The notion of freedom in John Rawls
Abstract
Different meanings exist for the concept of freedom in the work of Rawls. Freedom as exemption of ties or absence of restrictions, freedom as an assembly of rights and duties defined by the institutions whose purpose is to guarantee to the subjects the possibility of choosing their own way of life and the values that orient their life, considering the plurality of the conceptions of good. From this concept, Rawls claims the principIe according to which inequalities are justified when they benefit the most underprivileged. The theory of freedom is referred to its merely outer conception, that is not properly a quality of the will, but it mainly talks about the external performance of it, whith the consequence of the negation of free will. The author criticizes Rawls for not accurately justifing the limits of freedom: the principIe according to which freedom is limited by not interfering with the freedom or project of life of others. The author says that Rawls does not solve neither the
dilemmas supposed by the necessary coordination of subjective goods in order to guarantee that all subjects yield part of their interests or their freedom, nor a system in which it is possible the exercise of freedom by the most underprivileged. Finally, the work of Rawls is identified with the modern paradigm of freedom, that establishes the absolute and free autonomy without intrinsic order.
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